Mentalization is always from somewhere: it is the capacity to understand one’s own and others’ mental states from an organized first-person point of view. Yet this point of view often remains implicit in current accounts. In this presentation, I will argue that mentalization depends not only on representing beliefs, intentions, or emotions, but also on the structure of the experiential field within which self and other can appear, be appraised, and be imaginatively transformed.
I will introduce the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) as a generative framework for this problem. Recent formal work suggests that, under explicit constraints on perspectival perception, coherent viewpoint change, and control of action, a projective organization of consciousness is not merely a useful metaphor but a principled solution. In this framework, conscious experience is structured as a projective field integrating perception, imagination, affective appraisal, and action under active inference.
On this basis, mentalization can be modeled as a family of controlled transformations between perspectives. This helps formalize level-1 and level-2 perspective taking, Theory of Mind, joint attention, false-belief reasoning, and some aspects of empathy. I will illustrate these ideas with interactive and immersive paradigms involving virtual or robotic agents, in which agents infer others’ perspectives, preferences, and likely actions.
The key point, however, is not only that projective structure represents space differently. It also reshapes epistemic value. The field of consciousness functions as a perspective-dependent lens that modulates presence, salience, uncertainty, attraction, aversion, and urgency. In this sense, projective structure organizes not only representation, but also drive. Curiosity is therefore not an add-on to mentalization. It is built into how a projectively organized agent samples the world, including the interpersonal world. This links affective and epistemic organization within a single framework.
From this perspective, turbulence may disturb mentalization at a deeper level than explicit belief content alone. What becomes altered may be the framing of the interpersonal field itself: narrowing of perspective, rigidity, threat magnification, collapse of exploratory openness, and difficulty sustaining trust in what may be learned from another mind. This suggests that some failures of mentalization reflect a disturbance in the regulation of perspective, appraisal, and curiosity. MBT may then be understood, in part, as helping to restore a more flexible, curious, and trustworthy space for self-other understanding.
Presenters – Martin DEBBANÉ – Geneva, Switzerland / Pascal VRTICKA – Colchester, UK / David RUDRAUF Paris, France
Workshop 4 – Thursday May 28 – 15:45 – 17:15 – Amphithéâtre Farabeuf